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Broker-dealers provide investors with the platform to 
access security markets. To facilitate this access, clients 
entrust them with sensitive information, including their 
names, addresses, and social security numbers. Cyberattacks 
on the financial sector have advanced in sophistication and 
grown more frequent due to technological advances, 
adjustments in firm business models, and changes in 
customer behavior, causing new vulnerabilities in firm 
information systems. However, even with this increase of 
cyberattacks against broker-dealers, the lack of public 
disclosure requirements means little is known about the 
extent of broker-dealer cyber safety. 
Under current SEC regulations, broker-dealers must take 
preventative action, such as establishing safeguards against 
cyber breaches and maintaining security programs that can 
identify red flags. However, after a cyberattack occurs, firms 
are only required to file a Suspicious Activity Report to 
FinCEN, a bureau within the Treasury Department. Unlike 
public companies and banks, broker-dealers do not have any 
federal disclosure requirement to the general public for 
cybersecurity incidents. Addressing this gap requires a 
comprehensive examination of the tradeoffs involved in 
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implementing broad new federal disclosure requirements for 
broker-dealers following cybersecurity incidents. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Broker-dealers provide investors with a platform to access 
securities markets. Their clients entrust them with sensitive 
information including names, addresses, social security 
numbers, and even financial information, such as annual 
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income and net worth.1 However, according to a 2015 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) report, eighty-
eight percent of broker-dealers have been the victims of 
cyberattacks, a significant number of which involved losses 
of over $5000.2 Moreover, cyberattacks in the financial sector 
have grown more frequent and sophisticated due to 
technological advances, adjustments in firm business 
models, and changes in how customers use technology, each 
of which cause new vulnerabilities in firm information 
systems.3 Other than a handful of famous data breaches, 
such as those involving Fidelity in 20144 and TD Ameritrade 
in 2007,5 a lack of public disclosure requirements means that 
little is known about the extent of broker-dealer cyber 
safety.6 
Under current SEC regulations, broker-dealers must take 
preventative actions like establishing safeguards against 
cyber breaches and maintaining security programs that can 
identify red flags.7 These include adopting policies and 
procedures to protect customer information and to detect, 
 
1 What to Expect When You Open a Brokerage Account, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/investors/what-expect-when-you-
open-brokerage-account [https://perma.cc/2349-WW8N]. 
2 See Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, 
Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, SEC NAT’L EXAM PROGRAM 
RISK ALERT, Feb. 3, 2015, at 2–3, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/cybersecurity-examination-sweep-
summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVR6-C6Q7]. 
3 FINRA, REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES 1 (2015), 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%20Report%20 
on%20Cybersecurity%20Practices_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF8E-Z9XB]. 
4 Danielle Walker, JPMorgan Hackers Targeted 13 Firms, Including 
Fidelity, Report Reveals, SC MEDIA (Oct. 10, 2014), 
https://www.scmagazine.com/jpmorgan-data-breach-targeted-fidelity-12-
others/article/540011/ [https://perma.cc/5A85-8KXP]. 
5 Dawn Kawamoto, TD Ameritrade’s 6 Million Customers Hit with 
Security Breach, CNET (Nov. 26, 2007, 3:42 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/td-ameritrades-6-million-customers-hit-with-
security-breach/ (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
7 See infra Section II.C.1. 
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prevent, and mitigate identity theft.8 Once a serious 
cyberattack occurs, the firm’s only obligation is to file a 
Suspicious Activity Report with the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), a bureau within the 
Treasury Department.9 Unlike public companies and banks, 
no federal disclosure requirement mandates that broker-
dealers notify the general public about cybersecurity 
incidents.10 States have started to fill in the gap with a 
patchwork of regulation.11 Notably, New York, Vermont, and 
Colorado each enacted different schemes for addressing 
cyber-risks and breaches.12 Most states also have statutes 
requiring that companies disclose breaches compromising 
their residents’ social security numbers and credit card 
information.13 However, these laws are broadly applied and 
are not tailored to the specific needs of the broker-dealer 
industry. This Note argues that this lacuna in the regulatory 
framework should be addressed by applying specific federal 
disclosure requirements to broker-dealers for cybersecurity 
incidents. 
Part II of this Note provides the regulatory backdrop of 
cybersecurity disclosure requirements. Specifically, Part II 
reviews the contrasting requirements imposed by regulators 
on public companies and banks, and then examines the 
federal, state, and international requirements currently in 
place for broker-dealers. Part III identifies the unique 
characteristics of broker-dealers that must be taken into 
account when addressing cybersecurity incidents. Part IV 
presents potential solutions and proposes federal disclosure 
requirements which specifically address broker-dealer 
concerns. Part V offers concluding remarks. 
 
8 See infra text accompanying note 71. 
9 See infra Section II.C.3. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
11 See infra Section II.D. 
12 See infra Section II.D.1. 
13 See infra Section II.D.2. 
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II. THE CURRENT CYBERSECURITY DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 
Regulators protect consumers through different 
regulatory schemes, depending on the type of financial entity 
entrusted with the consumers’ information. This Part 
explores the various ways in which regulators protect 
consumer data. Sections II.A and II.B examine the 
discrepancy between the regulations that are geared toward 
public companies versus banks. Section II.C provides an 
overview of the current federal cybersecurity regulations 
imposed on broker-dealers. Section II.D describes recently 
enacted state disclosure legislation that broadly impacts all 
financial entities. Section II.E briefly provides some 
international background, comparing the regulatory 
requirements in the United States with recent regulatory 
changes in the European Union. 
A. Public Company Materiality Standard 
The basis of the SEC’s public company regulatory regime 
is disclosure. During the Great Depression, Congress passed 
the Securities Act of 193314 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934,15 two important statutes enacted to regulate the 
securities markets and limit manipulative activities 
therein.16 The Securities Act of 1933 created the SEC, whose 
stated mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”17 
However, instead of endowing the SEC with more 
substantive responsibilities,18 the Act primarily focuses on 
 
14 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012). 
15 Id. § 78a. 
16 See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory 
Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 342–51 (1988). 
17 What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.U_UePRZ7Tww 
[https://perma.cc/VL4W-SXZ5] (last modified June 10, 2013). 
18 In contrast to the SEC’s disclosure regime, many state-level blue 
sky statutes grant state regulators the power to conduct “merit 
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mandatory disclosure requirements for public companies to 
enable investors to make sound investment decisions.19 To 
that end, the SEC requires companies to file annual 10-K 
Forms,20 quarterly 10-Q Forms,21 and 8-K Forms after the 
occurrence of specified triggering circumstances, such as a 
bankruptcy or a change in the company’s certifying 
accountant.22 
Companies are not required to disclose all information; 
the requirement is limited by a materiality standard.23 
Companies only must disclose “matters to which there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
attach importance in determining whether to purchase the 
security registered.”24 The Supreme Court has further 
clarified the materiality standard, requiring that “there must 
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information 
made available.”25 The materiality standard provides 
investors with all relevant and necessary information so that 
they will have a rational basis upon which to make 
investment decisions.26 This democratization of information, 
 
regulation.” Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to 
Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 105 (1987). 
These reviews are substantive in nature and allow the regulator to 
prevent a sale of securities in the state “when the offering or the issuer’s 
capital structure is substantively unfair or presents excessive risk to the 
investor.” Id. 
19 See Alan B. Levenson, The Role of the SEC as a Consumer 
Protection Agency, 27 BUS. LAW. 61, 62 (1971). 
20 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2018). 
21 See id. § 240.13a-13. 
22 See id. § 240.13a-11; Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8khtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/HL6M-VSNR] (last modified Aug. 10, 2012). 
23 See Levenson, supra note 19, at 62, 65. 
24 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2018). 
25 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
26 Levenson, supra note 19, at 62. 
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policymakers believe, will ensure a fair and efficient market 
and enhance corporate governance.27 
Although the materiality standard may have applied to 
corporate risks (including cybersecurity matters) prior to 
2011, many companies did not report cybersecurity 
information in their public filings, and the SEC had not 
issued specific guidance on the topic.28 According to a 2009 
survey by insurance company Hiscox, “[t]hirty-eight percent 
of Fortune 500 companies [surveyed] fail to acknowledge the 
threat of a data breach in the Risk Factors section of their 
SEC 10-K filing.”29 The report adds that “of the companies 
that do include the risk of a data breach in their 10-K, 26 
percent fail to mention the consequential financial impact 
while a further 49 percent failed to identify the reputational 
impact.”30 As SEC Commissioner Mary Jo White explained, 
“[w]hen the Commission adopted rules decades ago requiring 
a description of the company’s business, risk factor 
disclosure and [management discussion & analysis], there 
were no such things as smartphones, tablets, or even the 
internet. And, so the SEC was not thinking about the risks 
presented by cybersecurity attacks or breaches.”31 
 
27 See id.; see also Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, 
"Pure Information," and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
1601, 1606 (2012). 
28 See Press Release, Hiscox, U.S. Companies Still Underestimate 
Impact of Data Breaches, Says Hiscox Report [hereinafter Hiscox Report], 
http://www.hiscoxgroup.com/news/press-releases/archive/2009/22-04-
09.aspx?p=1 [https://perma.cc/3REC-C7RW]; see also Letter from John D. 
Rockefeller IV, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & 
Transp., Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator, Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. 
Senator, Mark Warner, U.S. Senator, & Richard Blumenthal, U.S. 




29 Hiscox Report, supra note 28. 
30 Id. 
31 Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure, 
Address to the National Association of Corporate Directors (Oct. 15, 2013) 
(transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch101513mjw 
[https://perma.cc/DH8T-LYH4]). 
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In October 2011, the SEC responded with guidelines for 
public companies’ cybersecurity disclosure responsibilities.32 
SEC Commissioner White explained, “[e]ven though 
cybersecurity attacks were not specifically contemplated, the 
disclosure requirements generally cover these risks. That is 
because, even in the absence of a line item requirement, the 
basic standard of ‘materiality’ governs. Depending on the 
severity and impact of the cybersecurity attacks, disclosure 
is either required or not.”33 The guidance examines the 
various sections that are currently disclosed in a Form 10-
K—risk factors, management’s discussion and analysis 
(“MD&A”), description of business, legal proceedings, 
financial statement disclosures, and disclosure controls and 
procedures—and explains the cybersecurity risks a company 
must consider in each corresponding section of its 
disclosures.34 
Regarding risk factors, the guidance advises disclosing 
the risk of cyber incidents “if these issues are among the 
most significant factors that make an investment in the 
company speculative or risky.”35 This criterion did not 
provide much clarity, though, as the requirement is identical 
to the normal materiality threshold for reporting risk 
factors.36 The guidance further instructs companies to 
address cybersecurity risks in their MD&A section, just as 
the normal materiality threshold: 
 
32 See SEC, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 (2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XH5N-HHDU]. The SEC announced in November 2017 
that it would seek even stricter cybersecurity disclosure requirements. See 
generally Ezequiel Minaya, SEC Says Companies Can Expect New 
Guidelines on Reporting Cybersecurity Breaches, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2017, 
5:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-says-companies-can-expect-
new-guidelines-on-reporting-cybersecurity-breaches-1510267201 (on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
33 White, supra note 31. 
34 See SEC, supra note 32. 
35 Id. 
36 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2018). 
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if the costs or other consequences associated with one 
or more known incidents or the risk of potential 
incidents represent a material event, trend, or 
uncertainty that is reasonably likely to have a 
material effect on the registrant’s results of 
operations, liquidity, or financial condition or would 
cause reported financial information not to be 
necessarily indicative of future operating results or 
financial condition.37 
The guidance instructs companies to include information 
in the business description section if a cyber incident 
materially affects products, services, customer relationships, 
or competitive conditions.38 Similarly, companies should 
disclose legal proceedings related to cyber incidents and costs 
related to cyber incidents in the financial statement 
disclosures section if they are considered material 
“depending on the nature and severity of the potential or 
actual incident.”39 Finally, companies must report disclosure 
controls and procedures “[t]o the extent cyber incidents pose 
a risk to a registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize, 
and report” necessary filing information.40 
In short, the guidance does not add any new reporting 
requirements, but rather treats cyber risks as ordinary 
business risks in adopting largely the same approach as 
current rules regarding material disclosure.41 Furthermore, 
although the guidance provides information regarding 
disclosure requirements, it is not technically legally binding. 
In an introductory note, the guidance makes clear that it “is 
not a rule, regulation, or statement of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.”42 However, the SEC’s approach did 
 




41 Rodney F. Tonkovic, An Overview of the SEC’s Efforts to Construct 
a Regulatory Response to the Problem of Cybersecurity Issue No. 628, CORP. 
GOVERNANCE GUIDE 10676407, WOLTERS KLUWER, May 30, 2014, 2014 WL 
10676407. 
42 SEC, supra note 32. 
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make it explicitly clear that companies must report 
cybersecurity risks under the same materiality standard as 
other disclosures, and failing to comply may result in SEC 
enforcement actions. 
B. Bank Disclosure Requirements 
Unlike the disclosure regime governing public companies, 
regulators have traditionally not subjected banks to the 
same materiality standard. Instead, regulators seek to 
maintain the confidentiality of bank financial information, 
due to banks’ sensitivity to potential loss of investor and 
depositor confidence.43 If banks are not publicly traded, they 
do not have to file any reports with the SEC but instead 
must disclose limited financial information with banking 
regulators such as the Federal Reserve and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).44 
In March 2005, several banking regulators decided that 
the danger of losing public confidence in banks was 
outweighed by growing cybersecurity threats.45 In response, 
they promulgated the Interagency Guidance on Response 
Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information 
and Customer Notice.46 This guideline includes an 
 
43 See Laurie Durcan & Bruce K. Riordan, Banking Disclosures, 
Financial Privacy, and the Public Interest, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 391, 
391 (1987). 
44 Information About Some Companies Not Available from the SEC, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/noinfo.htm [https://perma.cc/AC4H-NJD9] (last modified Nov. 26, 
2013). 
45 See generally Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for 
Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, 70 
Fed. Reg. 15,736 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
46 See id.; see also Heather Zachary & Nicole Ewart, Cybersecurity, 
Privacy and Communications Webinar: Financial Privacy Primer, 
WILMERHALE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/ 
Shared_Content/Events/Documents/2017-03-23-WilmerHale-webinar-
financial-privacy-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7ZA-D6U4]. The regulators 
involved in promulgating the regulation were the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (“OCC”), the Treasury Department, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”), the 
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interpretation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requirement 
that banks maintain programs ensuring the security of 
customer information and protecting customer information 
against unauthorized access.47 More importantly, the 
guidance prescribes a risk-based incident response program, 
including timely notification of customers affected by a 
breach.48 The regulatory agencies clarify that the 
circumstances requiring notification are instances in which 
the bank has reason to believe that “misuse of its 
information about a customer has occurred or is reasonably 
possible.”49 The guidance also limits the type of information 
requiring notification to “sensitive customer information,” 
defined as “a customer’s name, address, or telephone 
number, in conjunction with the customer’s social security 
number, driver’s license number, account number, credit or 
debit card number, or a personal identification number or 
password that would permit access to the customer’s 
account.”50 
In October 2016, following several high profile bank 
cyberattacks on targets like JPMorgan Chase51 and 
Bangladesh’s central bank,52 several banking regulators 
 
FDIC, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. Interagency Guidance on 
Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and 
Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,736 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
47 See Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized 
Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 
15,751. 
48 Id. at 15,743. 
49 Id. at 15,749. 
50 Id. at 15,745. 
51 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Matthew Goldstein & Nicole 
Perlroth, JPMorgan Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million Households, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:50 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/ 
[https://perma.cc/HF25-DBAU]. 
52 See Raju Gopalakrishnan & Manuel Mogato, Bangladesh Bank 
Official’s Computer Was Hacked to Carry Out $81 Million Heist: Diplomat, 
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published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking for 
cyber-risk governance and management with stricter 
standards.53 The proposed rule would require banks with 
fifty billion dollars or more in assets to develop and maintain 
a formal cyber-risk management strategy, implement cyber-
risk assessment tests, and ensure that the organization’s 
board of directors has adequate cyber expertise.54 However, 
the proposed regulation is still in its embryonic stages and 
the three biggest financial industry groups have already 
lodged heavy criticisms that it is “impractical and technically 
infeasible.”55 Moreover, regulators under the Trump 
administration have recently signaled that they would not 
move forward with the proposed rule.56 
 
53 See Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, 81 Fed. Reg. 
74,315 (proposed Oct. 26, 2016). The notice was published by the Federal 
Reserve, the OCC, and the FDIC. Id. 
54 See id. at 74,320–25. 
55 See Email from Thomas M. Wagner, Managing Dir., Sec. Indus. & 
Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Doug Johnson, Senior Vice President, Am. Bankers Ass’n 
& Richard Coffman, Gen. Counsel, Inst. of Int’l Bankers to Robert deV. 
Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Legislative & Regulatory 
Activities Div., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, & Robert E. 
Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, Comments, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 3 (Feb. 17, 
2017), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SIFMA-ABA-
and-IIB-Submit-Comments-to-Multiple-Agencies-on-Enhanced-Cyber-
Risk-Management-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVC7-K7E3]; see also 
Paul Merrion, Leading Financial Sector Groups Balk at Enhanced 
Cybersecurity Standards, CQ ROLL CALL, Feb. 22, 2017, 2017 WL 693802. 
The letter criticizes the prescriptive nature of the requirements, and 
instead requests a risk-based approach. Wagner, et al., supra. More 
specifically, the letter underscores that the proposed “requirement of [a 
recovery time objective] of two hours for sector-critical systems is not 
technically feasible and might have the unintended consequence of 
restoring a system to operation before the nature of the threat or the 
effects of the event have been fully understood and remediated.” Id. at 3. 
56 See Jody Westby, Bon Appétit! Cyber Regs Are a Mouthful, 
LEADER’S EDGE (Apr. 2018), https://leadersedgemagazine.com/articles/ 
%202018/03/bon-appetit [https://perma.cc/N4T4-HSYH]. 
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C. Federal Broker-Dealer Requirements 
In contrast to both public companies and banks, broker-
dealers have no current federal disclosure requirements to 
the public for cyber incidents. Similar to their treatment of 
banks, regulators have not traditionally subjected broker-
dealers to the materiality disclosure standard of public 
companies or required them to make sweeping quarterly 
SEC filings.57 Furthermore, broker-dealers were excluded 
from the interagency guidance in March 2005, which 
mandated banking disclosure requirements for cyber 
incidents.58 In addition, the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”), the primary self-regulator of the 
broker-dealer industry, has neither issued nor plans to issue 
any cybersecurity rules in the future.59 However, FINRA did 
issue a report on cybersecurity best practices60 and does 
independently review firms’ compliance with SEC 
regulations.61 
 
57 See Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers 
and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 402 (2010). Broker-dealers do, 
however, have some limited disclosure requirements regarding fair-
dealing, conflicts of interest, credit terms, privacy policies, and sharing 
nonpublic customer information. Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-
publications/divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html [https://perma.cc/5PWK-
84DQ] (last modified Dec. 12, 2016). 
58 Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized 
Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 
15,736, 15,738, n.6 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
59 A Few Minutes with FINRA: Cybersecurity – Part I, FINRA (June 
27, 2017), http://www.finra.org/industry/afmwf-cybersecurity-part1 
[https://perma.cc/N8DN-NVMR] (showing an interview with Susan 
Axelrod, FINRA’s Executive Vice President for the Office of Regulatory 
Operations, who explains that with regard to cybersecurity, FINRA’s role 
is not to make rules but to “help firms understand where the issues and 
challenges are, help inform them of best practices, and continue to engage 
in where the firms individually can do better.”). 
60 FINRA, supra note 3. 
61 Cybersecurity, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/cybersecurity 
[https://perma.cc/737P-U9NP]. 
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Although the SEC has not created a disclosure standard, 
it regulates broker-dealer cybersecurity through Regulations 
S-P and S-ID and enforces its guidelines through compliance 
examinations.62 Furthermore, the Treasury Department 
requires that broker-dealers report suspicious activities, 
including cyberattacks, through regular filings.63 Over the 
years, there have also been two unsuccessful attempts—
through both legislative and regulatory means—to create a 
federal disclosure standard for broker-dealers.64 
1. SEC Regulations S-P and S-ID 
In June 2000, under congressional authorization from 
section 504 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, the SEC 
promulgated Regulation S-P to ensure that financial 
institutions protect the security and confidentiality of private 
consumer information.65 The regulation prohibits broker-
dealers and financial advisers from disclosing a customer’s 
nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third-parties 
without first providing the customer a privacy notice and an 
opportunity to opt-out.66 The regulation only addresses 
intentional disclosures made by the firm and does not 
require any disclosure to customers regarding unauthorized 
access to their information by third parties, such as 
computer hackers.  
The regulation does, however, impose a duty on broker-
dealers to adopt written policies and procedures designed to 
protect nonpublic personal customer information and 
prevent unauthorized intrusions.67 These policies must 
ensure the security and confidentiality of customer 
 
62 See infra Section II.C.1–2. 
63 See infra Section II.C.3. 
64 See infra Section II.C.4. 
65 Regulation S-P: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information and 
Safeguarding Personal Information, 17 C.F.R. § 248.1–100 (2018); see also 
SEC Adopts Financial Privacy Rules, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. (June 
29, 2000), https://www.ici.org/policy/regulation/privacy/00_SEC_PRIV_ 
FINAL [https://perma.cc/E6WD-4PLC]. 
66 See 17 C.F.R. § 248.10 (2018). 
67 See id. § 248.30. 
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information, protect against any foreseeable threats, and 
“[p]rotect against unauthorized access to or use of customer 
records or information that could result in substantial harm 
or inconvenience to any customer.”68 To ensure compliance 
with this rule, the SEC issued another rule in 2003 requiring 
firms to “designate a chief compliance officer to be 
responsible for administering [the firm’s] policies and 
procedures.”69 
As instructed by Congress after the financial crisis of 
2008 in the Dodd Frank Act, the SEC and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) jointly promulgated 
Regulation S-ID to prevent identity theft in “covered 
accounts.”70 The rule requires broker-dealers to establish 
written policies to “detect, prevent, and mitigate identity 
theft” using a red flags system that assesses potential risks 
to customer accounts.71 Broker-dealers should authenticate 
the customers’ identities, monitor transactions, and verify 
changes of customer addresses.72 Firms should also be alert 
for warnings from consumer reporting agencies, unusual 
account activity, suspicious documents or personal 
information, and notices from customers or law enforcement 
about potential identity theft.73 
 
68 Id. 
69 Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment 
Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
70 See Identity Theft Red Flags Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,638, 23,640 
(Apr. 19, 2013). The rule defines a “covered account” as “[a]n account that 
a financial institution or creditor offers or maintains, primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes, that involves or is designed to 
permit multiple payments or transactions” or “any other account that the 
financial institution or creditor offers or maintains for which there is a 
reasonably foreseeable risk to customers or to the safety and soundness of 
the financial institution or creditor from identity theft, including financial, 
operational, compliance, reputation, or litigation risks.” Id. at 23,644. The 
guidance specifically includes a brokerage account held with a broker-
dealer in the definition. Id. 
71 Id. at 23,640, 23,645–46. 
72 Id. at 23,661. 
73 Id. 
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Although not covered extensively, a footnote in the rule 
release mentions the risk of identity theft by cyber criminals 
who “con financial advisers into wiring cash out of their 
clients’ online investment accounts” by tricking the adviser 
into legitimately executing a wire transfer so “cash flows into 
a bank account controlled by the thieves—leaving the victim 
in a dispute with the financial adviser over getting made 
whole.”74 While the rule instructs broker-dealers to prevent 
and detect these cyberattacks through risk assessment, it 
does not require any customer disclosures about 
cyberattacks, instead treating disclosure as one of several 
“appropriate” responses while investigating suspicious 
activity.75 
2. SEC OCIE Examinations 
The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations 
(“OCIE”), a branch of the SEC, was created in 1995 to 
conduct regular inspections of broker-dealers in order to 
protect investors and ensure market integrity.76 OCIE 
monitors the behavior of market participants, improves firm 
compliance with SEC regulations and securities laws, and 
uses the results of its inspections to inform future SEC rule-
making.77 Recognizing the growing risk of cyberattacks to 
broker-dealers, OCIE launched a cybersecurity initiative in 
2014 to assess broker-dealers’ preparedness.78 In its 
 
74 Id. at 23,642 n.57 (quoting Byron Acohido, Cybercrooks Fool 
Financial Advisers to Steal from Clients, USA TODAY (Aug. 26, 2012, 7:07 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/story/2012-08-
26/wire-transfer-fraud/57335540/1 [https://perma.cc/N69T-NLTR]). 
75 See id. at 23,661. 
76 See Lori A. Richards & John H. Walsh, Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 52 BUS. LAW. 
119, 119–20 (1996); see also About the Office of Compliance Inspections 
and Examinations, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION [hereinafter About 
OCIE], https://www.sec.gov/ocie/Article/ocie-about.html 
[https://perma.cc/8YDH-UYXL] (last modified July 21, 2017). 
77 See About OCIE, supra note 76. 
78 See Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, OCIE 
Cybersecurity Initiative, SEC NAT’L EXAM PROGRAM RISK ALERT, Apr. 15, 
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cybersecurity examination sweep, OCIE found that eighty-
eight percent of the examined broker-dealers had been 
targeted by cyberattacks, while over half received fraudulent 
emails seeking to transfer client funds.79 On the bright side, 
however, the overwhelming majority of broker-dealers 
examined had written information security policies and 
routinely conducted risk assessments to identify 
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.80 In other sweeps, 
OCIE focused on firm cybersecurity governance and risk 
assessment, access rights and controls, data loss prevention, 
vendor management, training, and incident response.81 
3. FinCEN SAR Reporting 
Even though broker-dealers are not required to disclose 
cyberattacks to the public, they must report certain attacks 
to the government. Whenever a broker-dealer suspects a 
criminal violation or a transaction potentially involving 
money laundering exceeding specific monetary thresholds, it 
must file a Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) with a 
Treasury Department bureau called the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).82 In October 2016, 
FinCEN issued an advisory that financial institutions are 
required to report cyber events that involve $5000 or more in 
funds or assets.83 Notably, FinCEN defines a cyber event as 
 
2014, at 1, https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/Cybersecurity-Risk-
Alert--Appendix---4.15.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/YVB2-B92F]. 
79 See Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, supra note 
2, at 2–3. 
80 See id. at 2. 
81 See Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, OCIE’s 
2015 Cybersecurity Examination Initiative, SEC NAT’L EXAM PROGRAM 
RISK ALERT, Sep. 15, 2015, at 2–3, 
https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/ocie-2015-cybersecurity-
examination-initiative.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B3U-3X6U]. 
82 See 12 C.F.R. § 353.1–3 (2018). 
83 See FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-
2016-A005, ADVISORY TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CYBER-EVENTS AND 
CYBER-ENABLED CRIME 4 (2016) [hereinafter SAR ADVISORY], 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2016-10-
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“[a]n attempt to compromise or gain unauthorized electronic 
access to electronic systems, services, resources, or 
information.”84 The bureau further clarifies that even 
unsuccessful hacking attempts must be reported.85 
Since the purpose of an SAR is to help the government 
combat illegal activity, FinCEN encourages firms to report 
as much information about the cyber event as possible, 
including indicators of compromise, IP addresses, device 
identifiers, and the types of methodologies used.86 
Furthermore, FinCEN recommends that financial 
institutions pool resources and work together to identify 
potential threats and vulnerabilities.87 However, firms must 
keep the existence of their reported SARs confidential to 
avoid tipping off the suspected criminals about law 
enforcement involvement.88 
4. Unsuccessful Attempts at Disclosure 
Requirements 
The federal government has unsuccessfully attempted to 
create a federal disclosure standard for broker-dealers 
regarding cyberattacks on various occasions. Since 2005, 
senators have introduced several pieces of legislation that 




84 Id. at 1. 
85 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Regarding the Reporting of 
Cyber-Events, Cyber-Enabled Crime, and Cyber-Related Information 
Through Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, 
(Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/frequently-asked-questions-faqs-
regarding-reporting-cyber-events-cyber-enabled-crime-and-cyber 
[https://perma.cc/T5DQ-KLHZ]. 
86 See SAR ADVISORY, supra note 83, at 6–7. 
87 See id. at 8–9. 
88 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2014); id. § 1020.320(e); FIN. CRIMES 
ENF’T NETWORK, FINCEN SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT (FINCEN SAR) 
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on businesses and federal agencies, but each failed. In June 
2005, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Personal Data 
Privacy and Security Act of 2005.89 The bill mandated that  
any business entity or agency engaged in interstate 
commerce that involves collecting, accessing, using, 
transmitting, storing, or disposing of personally 
identifiable information shall notify, following the 
discovery of a security breach of its systems or 
databases in its possession or direct control when 
such security breach impacts sensitive personally 
identifiable information.90 
Nearly identical bills were introduced in the Senate in 
2007,91 2009,92 2011,93 and 2014,94 but none of these bills 
were passed by the Senate.95 Moreover, a similar bill entitled 
the Data Security and Breach Notification Act was 
introduced to the Senate almost every year from 2010–
2017.96 In addition to requiring disclosure of breaches, this 
bill would impose a fine of at least $1000 and a prison 
sentence of up to five years for willfully concealing a 
 
89 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1332, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
90 Id. 
91 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
92 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
93 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011, S. 1151, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
94 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th 
Cong. (2014). 
95 See Brett V. Newman, Hacking the Current System: Congress’ 
Attempt to Pass Data Security and Breach Notification Legislation, U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 437, 449 (2015). 
96 See Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2010, S. 3742, 
111th Cong. (2010); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2011, S. 
1207, 112th Cong. (2011); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 
2012, S. 3333, 112th Cong. (2012); Data Security and Breach Notification 
Act of 2013, S. 1193, 113th Cong. (2013); Data Security and Breach 
Notification Act of 2014, S. 1976, 113th Cong. (2014); Data Security and 
Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security 
and Breach Notification Act, S. 2179, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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breach.97 However, this bill was never passed by the Senate 
either.98 
Alternatively, the SEC attempted to create a federal 
disclosure standard for businesses and federal agencies 
through a proposed amendment to Regulation S-P in 2008.99 
The proposed rule would transcend the general requirements 
of maintaining information security protocols and protecting 
customer information by adding specific steps that broker-
dealers must take to prevent and respond to cyberattacks.100 
Firms would have to designate a specific employee to 
coordinate the security program, perform a written risk 
assessment, regularly test and monitor the effectiveness of 
the key controls against attacks and intrusions, routinely 
adjust the controls in light of testing, and provide training to 
employees about the information security protocols.101  
The proposed rule would also require broker-dealers to 
establish procedures for responding to cyberattacks. Notably, 
firms must “promptly conduct a reasonable investigation and 
make a written determination of the likelihood that sensitive 
personal information has been or will be misused,” and if 
misuse of the information has occurred or is reasonably 
likely, firms are required to “notify affected individuals as 
soon as possible.”102 Given that the notification is intended 
to prevent identity theft, the rule defines “sensitive personal 
information” as ‘‘any personal information, or any 
combination of components of personal information, that 
would allow an unauthorized person to use, log into, or 
access an individual’s account, or to establish a new account 
 
97 See, e.g., Data Security and Breach Notification Act, S. 2179, 115th 
Cong. § 5(f) (2017). 
98 Current Legislation: All Information (Except Text) for S.2179 – Data 
Security and Breach Notification Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2179/all-info 
[https://perma.cc/6RZR-NBE4]. 
99 See generally Regulation S-P: Privacy of Consumer Financial 
Information and Safeguarding Personal Information, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,692 
(proposed Mar. 13, 2008). 
100 Id. at 13,707–08. 
101 Id. at 13,708, 13,713. 
102 Id. at 13,713. 
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using the individual’s identifying information.’’103 If enacted, 
this disclosure standard would be nearly identical to the 
banking requirement imposed under the March 2005 
Interagency Guidance.104 
However, proposed rules are not legally binding until 
after they go through a public comment period, are modified, 
and are released as final rules.105 Therefore, even though the 
amendment to Regulation S-P was proposed, considering the 
length of the time elapsed since proposal, it is highly 
unlikely that it will ever be promulgated as a final rule. 
Borrowing legislative terminology, the proposed regulation 
has suffered a fate equivalent to dying in committee. 
According to an internal audit of the SEC rulemaking 
process, for the twelve rules reviewed by the audit, the 
average time between the publication of proposed and final 
 
103 Id. at 13,697. The proposed rule goes on to list specific pieces of 
information that would meet this definition, “including the individual’s 
Social Security number, or any one of the individual’s name, telephone 
number, street address, e-mail address, or online user name, in 
combination with any one of the individual’s account number, credit or 
debit card number, driver’s license number, credit card expiration date or 
security code, mother’s maiden name, password, personal identification 
number, biometric authentication record, or other authenticating 
information.” Id. at 13,697–98. 
104 The March 2005 Interagency Guidance provides that “[w]hen a 
financial institution becomes aware of an incident of unauthorized access 
to sensitive customer information, the institution should conduct a 
reasonable investigation to promptly determine the likelihood that the 
information has been or will be misused. If the institution determines that 
misuse of its information about a customer has occurred or is reasonably 
possible, it should notify the affected customer as soon as possible. 
Customer notice may be delayed if an appropriate law enforcement agency 
determines that notification will interfere with a criminal investigation 
and provides the institution with a written request for the delay. However, 
the institution should notify its customers as soon as notification will no 
longer interfere with the investigation.” Interagency Guidance on 
Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and 
Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,752 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
105 Rick Firestone & K.C. Goyer, SEC Rulemaking and 
Implementation Under the Dodd-Frank Act, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. 
ELECTRONIC AGE, Oct. 2010, 14 No. 10 GLWSLAW 14. 
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rules was 450 days.106 In the past ten years of SEC data, the 
longest amount of time to finalize a proposed rule was just 
over three years.107 Around a third of proposed rules are 
never acted upon and die in the rulemaking process.108 Thus, 
given the nearly ten years of inaction, the proposed rule is 
moribund for all intents and purposes. 
D. Emerging State Cybersecurity Regulations and 
Data Disclosure Requirements 
1. State Cybersecurity Regulation 
Over the past few years, several states—including New 
York, Colorado, and Vermont—have introduced regulations 
to address the growing threat of cyberattacks in the financial 
sector. In February 2017, the New York Department of 
Financial Services (“DFS”) released regulations that require 
financial institutions operating in New York to develop a 
cybersecurity program, designate a Chief Information 
Security Officer, limit who has access to data or systems, 
notify the DFS of a cybersecurity event within seventy-two 
hours, and have a written incident response plan.109  
In May 2017, Colorado adopted regulations that require 
broker-dealers operating in the state to establish procedures 
to ensure cybersecurity, including using secure email for 
confidential personal information, authenticating employee 
 
106 The audit reviewed twelve rules from between 1999 and 2001. See 
SEC, RULEMAKING PROCESS, AUDIT NO. 347 (2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/aboutoigaudit347finhtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/KZF6-UJ5G]. 
107 Rulemaking Index, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/rulemaking-index.shtml [https://perma.cc/EA8V-
SFPR] (last modified Nov. 6, 2018). 
108 From 2008–17, of the 141 unique rules that were proposed by the 
SEC, 93 of them became final rules and the other 48 did not. Id. 
109 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017); see also 
Daniel Ilan et al., NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulations Take Effect, CLEARY 
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access to sensitive information, and conducting routine risk 
assessments.110 In May 2017, Vermont also promulgated 
cybersecurity regulations that require securities 
professionals operating in Vermont to establish information 
security protocols with nearly identical obligations to those 
in Colorado.111 Although these regulations apply to broker-
dealers operating in these states, they do not mandate any 
additional disclosure requirements. 
2. Data Breach Notification Laws 
Due to federal inaction, individual states have started 
enacting data breach notification laws for all entities doing 
business within their state; however, the laws vary greatly 
in their breadth and rigor.112 California was the first state to 
pass a data breach notification law in 2002, but in the past 
two decades, all fifty states as well as the District of 
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have 
enacted some form of data breach notification law.113 This 
patchwork approach had resulted in inconsistent results, as 
when Target Corporation paid an $18.5 million settlement to 
forty-seven states in relation to its 2013 data breach, but 
Alabama was not included because it did not yet have a data 
breach notification law.114 In other words, Target owed no 
legal obligation to Alabama residents to protect their 
 
110 See COLO. CODE REGS. § 704-1:51-4.8 (2018). 
111 See 4-4 VT. CODE R. § 8:8-4 (2018). 
112 See Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving 
Efficiency Through a State-Informed Federal Data Breach Notification and 
Data Protection Law, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 63–65 (2015). 
113 Id. at 63; Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/SK6P-Q82B]. Alabama and South 
Dakota, the last two states to do so, only passed such laws in 2018. 
114 Leada Gore, Why Alabama Isn’t Cashing in on $18.5 Million 
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personal information from hacking or to notify them about a 
breach.115 
All state data breach notification statutes obligate 
entities to alert individuals when a data breach affects their 
personally identifiably information.116 These laws, however, 
vary widely on what entities are covered, what constitutes 
“personally identifiably information,” what type of 
notification must be provided, and whether data encryption 
provides a safe harbor.117 For instance, individuals and 
government agencies must notify Alaskans by written or 
electronic means if their personal information is 
compromised during a breach, unless the information is 
encrypted and the encryption key remains secure.118 Most 
states—including Alaska—define personally identifiably 
information to include names coupled with social security 
numbers, driver’s license numbers, financial account or 
credit card numbers, or security codes or passwords that 
would allow access to the account.119  
Thus, as one commentator put it, on a state level if “a 
[broker-dealer] experiences a breach, it is possible it could 
have no disclosures to make, or several, depending on where 
it is located and the nature of the information at issue.”120 
However, the bare disclosure requirements mandated by 
states are insufficient. As discussed in greater detail below, 
the statutory definitions of personally identifiably 
information in state laws typically do not include many types 
of data that would be particularly sensitive to broker-dealer 
 
115 See id. 
116 State Data Breach Laws Protected Personal Information Chart: 
Overview, PRAC. L. INTELL. PROP. & TECH., 2015 WL 3938380 [hereinafter 
State Data Laws]. 
117 Tschider, supra note 112, at 65–71; see also State Data Laws, 
supra note 116. 
118 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.010–090 (West 2018). 
119 See State Data Laws, supra note 116; see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
45.48.090 (West 2018). 
120 See Alan Wolper, The Equifax Breach May Be a Problem for More 
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customers, such as transactional information and trade 
histories.121 
E. European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation 
Unlike the United States’ patchwork of state and federal 
regulations (with industry-specific variations), the European 
Union recently overhauled its cybersecurity regime with the 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).122 Before the 
GDPR, the European Union regime mirrored that of the 
United States, governed piecemeal by conventions, 
directives, treaties, and individual European country 
rules.123 With the GDPR now in effect, however, there is a 
greater degree of uniformity.124 
The GDPR requires all organizations to implement 
technical measures to safeguard personal information, 
conduct risk assessments, and restrict usage of third party 
processors to those in compliance with the GDPR’s 
standards.125 Furthermore, the GDPR sets forth a universal 
 
121 See infra Section III.B. 
122 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such 
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. See generally 
Christina Glon, Data Protection in the European Union: A Closer Look at 
the Current Patchwork of Data Protection Laws and the Proposed Reform 
That Could Replace Them All, 42 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 471, 472 (2014). 
123 Glon, supra note 122, at 472. 
124 The GDPR went into effect on May 25, 2018. Jeewon Kim Serrato, 
Marcus Evans, Ffion Flockhart & Steven Hadwin, One Week into GDPR – 
What You Need to Know, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/06/one-week-into-gdpr-what-
you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/9878-85B6]; see also Courtney M. 
Bowman, A Primer on the GDPR: What You Need to Know, PROSKAUER 
ROSE (Dec. 23, 2015), https://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2015/12/articles 
/european-union/a-primer-on-the-gdpr-what-you-need-to-know/ 
[https://perma.cc/J39Q-6TEM]. 
125 Colin Pearson et al., Cybersecurity in the EU – The New Regime 
Under the GDPR and NISD, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-
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data breach notification requirement: when a “personal data 
breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall 
communicate the personal data breach to the data subject 
without undue delay” in clear and plain language, unless the 
information is encrypted and inaccessible to the 
unauthorized user.126 However, both the encryption safe 
haven and the demanding threshold of “high risk to the 
rights and freedoms” lessen the burden of the universal 
requirement. 
III. SPECIFIC BROKER-DEALER DISCLOURE 
CONCERNS 
A. Effects of Broker-Dealer Disclosures 
The need for a broker-dealer disclosure requirement is 
different from that of a public company, given the unique 
role played by broker-dealers in the financial markets. 
Broker-dealers buy and sell securities, acting as agents when 
they execute orders on behalf of their clients and as dealers 
when they trade on their own account.127 They are the 
primary interface between investors and the market, and 
they ensure the free flow of securities.128 Yet, without the 
listed stock prices available for public companies, their 
actions are not subject to any form of information discipline 





126 GDPR at art. 34, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
127 Broker-Dealer, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
b/broker-dealer.asp [https://perma.cc/5W36-HSRX]. 
128 Id. 
129 See Staff Guidance for Filing Broker-Dealer Notices, Statements, 
and Reports, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdnotices.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7PS6-K32U] (last modified May 24, 2017) (underscoring 
that most broker-dealer disclosures are provided to their designated 
examining authority, not to consumers). Broker-dealers must disclose to 
customers their certified balance sheet and information relating to their 
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Thus, the purpose of cybersecurity disclosures in a broker-
dealer context is not to provide better information to 
investors about their investments. Instead, it functions to 
alert them about the safety and security of their investments 
as a whole and to incentivize the broker-dealer to institute 
better security policies.130 A notification from a broker-dealer 
would signal the severity of the situation to the customer. 
Given the lack of information discipline mechanisms and 
public oversight, there is reason to consider disclosure a bare 
minimum requirement. There may even be justification for 
using a strict scrutiny standard or imposing an affirmative 
duty of care to safeguard against the threat of attacks. 
However, the specifics and potential risks of any new 
affirmative duty are beyond the scope of this Note. 
It is also important to consider that security concerns, not 
privacy concerns, form the basis of the current regulatory 
regime for broker-dealers.131 SEC Regulations S-P and S-ID 
target organizational practices such as establishing security 
protocols and monitoring for suspicious account activity.132 
These regulations focus on breach prevention, rather than 
addressing the resultant consequences of a breach. In effect, 
this security-oriented framework is missing an emphasis on 
the concrete harms a breach inflicts upon individuals.133 
Thus, a proposed disclosure requirement must balance 
organizational constraints with the potential damage to 
individuals from their lack of notification. 
B. Sensitive Information Collected by Broker-Dealers 
Broker-dealers are also unique in the types of information 
they acquire from customers. The range of data broker-
dealers collect extends beyond social security numbers and 
 
financial condition, but there is no pricing mechanism affected by these 
disclosures, as in public companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q(e)(1)(B) (2012). 
130 See Priscilla M. Regan, Federal Security Breach Notifications: 
Politics and Approaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1113 (2009). 
131 See id. at 1114. 
132 See supra Section II.C.1. 
133 Regan, supra note 130, at 1114. 
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credit card information, but state breach notification laws do 
not adequately address this broader scope.134 In 2003, the 
Treasury Department and several regulatory agencies jointly 
issued a rule mandating that broker-dealers must establish 
and maintain a customer identification program.135 Among 
other provisions, the rule requires that when a customer 
opens up a new account with a broker-dealer, the firm must 
collect and verify their name, date of birth, address, and 
social security number.136 These types of information are 
largely covered by the patchwork of state laws, but other 
information—including data collected in response to 
FINRA’s Know Your Customer Rule and Suitability Rule—
are not addressed by any disclosure regime. Yet, if breached, 
they may have consequences just as dire. 
Under the Know Your Customer Rule, broker-dealers 
must “use reasonable diligence, in regard to the opening and 
maintenance of every account, to know. . . the essential facts 
concerning every customer” and which individuals are 
authorized to act on behalf of such customer.137 The 
Suitability Rule goes even further, requiring firms to “have a 
reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction 
or investment strategy involving a security. . . is suitable for 
the customer.”138 The rule requires firms to base their 
investment strategy decisions on the customer’s investment 
profile, including “the customer’s age, other investments, 
financial situation and needs, tax status, investment 
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, 
liquidity needs, risk tolerance,” and other relevant 
 
134 See infra text accompanying notes 137–139. 
135 See Customer Identification Programs for Broker-Dealers, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 25,113, 25,113 (May 9, 2003). 
136 See 31 C.F.R. § 1023.220 (2018). Although this rule only applies to 
individuals opening up accounts (as opposed to entities), FinCEN recently 
enacted a rule that requires that the same information be collected about 
certain officers and owners of any entity opening an account. See 
Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 29,398 (May 11, 2016). 
137 FINRA, Rule 2090 (2012). 
138 FINRA, Rule 2111 (2014). 
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information that the customer provides.139 Furthermore, as 
the agent buying and selling securities for a customer, a 
broker-dealer has access to a customer’s transaction 
information and trading history. 
If a cyberattack compromises any of these types of 
information, including an investor’s investment history and 
risk tolerance, the consequences could potentially be 
devastating. For instance, an investor may face backlash 
from friends and the public at large for investments in 
companies that contravene the investor’s public political 
leanings. We can analogize to recent consumer backlashes 
regarding public companies that made political contributions 
to particular candidates or political parties.140 In a similar 
vein, if it became public that an individual invests in 
companies with poor environmental records or those utilizing 
child labor, it could greatly harm the individual’s reputation 
and finances. 
Moreover, a high net worth investor or hedge fund may 
have a proprietary investing strategy that would lose its 
value if revealed to the public. In 2015, security companies 
Kroll and FireEye investigated several incidents involving 
hackers who stole secret algorithms and trading tactics.141 
Some analysts consider such a cybersecurity threat even 
more concerning than a market crash, given that “[c]omputer 
source codes and proprietary trading methods are often the 
lifeblood of a company’s business model.”142 Although not 
 
139 Id. 
140 For instance, in August 2018, In-N-Out Burger faced social media 
calls for a boycott after it was revealed that the fast food chain had 
donated $25,000 to the California Republican Party. See Jeff Daniels, In-
N-Out Burger’s $25,000 Donation to California GOP Brings Call for 
Boycott from Democrats, CNBC (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/30/in-n-out-burger-faces-boycott-for-
california-gop-donation.html [https://perma.cc/987X-MB6A]. 
141 See Mathew J. Schwartz, Hackers Steal Trading Algorithms, 
BANKINFOSECURITY (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/ 
hackers-target-trading-algorithms-a-7949 [https://perma.cc/TE43-BKFS]. 
142 See id.; see also Kip McDaniel, Hacking a Hedge Fund, CHIEF INV. 
OFFICER (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/hacking-a-hedge-
fund/ [https://perma.cc/4DVK-49YR]. 
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addressed by state disclosure laws, a privacy-focused 
disclosure requirement geared towards broker-dealers would 
require that breaches of these categories of sensitive and 
proprietary information trigger notification to customers. 
This approach would provide customers with advance notice 
and a chance to perform damage control before the 
information potentially became public. 
C. Materiality Standard 
The public company materiality standard—requiring 
disclosures based on the likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would find the information important for an 
investment decision—is inapposite for broker-dealers, given 
the lack of information discipline mechanism and lack of 
public oversight.143 Additionally, state data breach 
disclosure laws do not provide any uniform guidelines. In 
some states, firms have a duty “to notify about any breach of 
security, while other states require notification of breach 
only when there is a reasonable likelihood of harm.”144 Since 
Massachusetts is arguably the state with the strictest data 
disclosure laws, one commentator suggested that companies 
should follow Massachusetts rules as a convenient and cost-
saving rule of thumb.145 Yet this advice is not as easy to 
follow as it seems, given differences in state laws regarding 
how information must be reported (i.e. whether only 
reporting to individuals, or also to state enforcement and 
credit agencies) and what information such reports must 
include.146 
It is important to note that, even if disclosure obligations 
are expanded to address broker-dealer specific concerns, one 
cannot abandon the materiality standard in a broker-dealer 
 
143 See supra Section III.A. 
144 See RSA 2012: Getting Strict with State Data Breach Notification 
Laws, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter RSA 2012], 
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/rsa-2012-getting-strict-with-
state-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/LQU5-S27J]. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
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context. A threshold for triggering disclosure is justified by 
the same rationale for broker-dealers as for public 
companies. If broker-dealers were required to report even 
immaterial events, consumers would be bombarded by an 
avalanche of notifications, which “can cause either undue 
alarm or desensitization to events of true concern.”147 
However, one key difference in application of a new 
disclosure regime for broker-dealers would be the emphasis 
of the threshold. To address cybersecurity concerns, the 
triggering threshold must consider the privacy-oriented 
nature of disclosures. For example, the GDPR in the 
European Union takes such a perspective. The trigger 
requiring GDPR disclosure is when there is a personal data 
breach unless it is “unlikely to result in a high risk to the 
rights and freedoms of natural persons.”148 Despite the 
change in focus, though, this is a very high threshold and 
may not be inclusive enough to address the needs of broker-
dealer customers, as discussed above.149 In adopting a 
broker-dealer specific standard, regulators could tweak this 
threshold to require disclosure “when the personal data 
breach is likely to result in substantial financial or 
reputational costs to customers.” This adjustment would 
protect broker-dealer customers against identity theft and 
loss of funds, and obligate broker-dealers to warn clients in 
the event that other sensitive information is accessed. 
Firms would be misguided to treat all threats equally 
when making determinations about resource allocation. A 
more compelling framework would construct a privacy threat 
continuum, with responses required in proportion to each 
threat. Consider a typical financial firm that uses a 
multilayered security approach including firewalls, antivirus 
software, spam filters, authentication, account monitoring, 
 
147 See Loren F. Selznick & Carolyn LaMacchia, Cybersecurity: 
Should the SEC Be Sticking Its Nose Under This Tent?, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y, 35, 52 (2016). 
148 GDPR at art. 33, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
149 See supra Section II.E. 
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encryption, and offsite data backup.150 Different types of 
threats—such as web application attacks, distributed denial 
of service (“DDoS”) attacks, data breaches, and insider 
attacks—may compromise different types of information.151 
Companies would also be wise to protect their most sensitive 
information with the highest level of security, further 
justifying a continuum framework.152 
On one end of the spectrum, a simple DDoS attack that 
brings down a company’s website may alarm the company 
about the need for better defenses, but if databases with 
customer information are never threatened, there would be 
no need to alert customers. Arguably, alerting customers 
would be detrimental, since such a notification would 
desensitize them to more serious threats.153 On the other 
end of the spectrum, a data breach by a hacker or an insider 
could compromise actual financial funds or key identifying 
information usable to steal a customer’s identity. In such a 
case, the broker-dealer should immediately alert customers 
and help them take preventative action, like alerting the 
three credit bureaus and encouraging customers to monitor 
and freeze their credit.154 In addition, while a broker-dealer’s 
suitability database is typically not covered by disclosure 
laws, if it is compromised and information about customer 
investing habits falls into the hands of a hacker, the firms 
 
150 See How Multi-Layered Network Protection Works, SOLARWINDS 
MSP, https://www.solarwindsmsp.com/content/multi-layered-security-
approach [https://perma.cc/5Y25-M48X]. 
151 See Top 4 Cyber Threats Facing the Financial Services Industry, 
IMPERVA (July 18, 2016), https://www.imperva.com/blog/2016/07/top-4-
cyber-threats-facing-the-financial-services-industry/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XEJ-D57A]. 
152 See Jans Aasman, Triple Attributes: A New Way to Protect the Most 
Sensitive Information, DATACONOMY (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://dataconomy.com/2017/10/triple-attributes-new-way-protect-
sensitive-information/ [https://perma.cc/75RM-U2AG]. 
153 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 147, at 52. 
154 See Ron Lieber, How to Protect Yourself After the Equifax Breach, 
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should alert customers. However, in this scenario, the 
disclosure should not require as much urgency and detail, 
given that the information does not directly compromise 
financial information. 
One further complicating factor is that a broker-dealer 
may not know that it suffered a cyberattack.155 
Alternatively, even if it is aware that a hacker breached its 
databases, it may not know exactly what information was 
stolen.156 Under those circumstances, the duty to disclose 
should attach at the time when the company discovers the 
extent of the attack. 
Similar to public companies’ disclosures, broker-dealers’ 
disclosures should not only be reactive, they should also be 
proactive, informing customers about the risks of a potential 
breach. Although the threshold cannot be the same as the 
standard applied to a public company (i.e., whether the 
security issues are among the most significant factors 
making the investment risky), broker-dealers should inform 
customers if there is a high probability that sensitive 
customer information is at risk. Such a determination would 
necessarily hinge upon subjective factors, such as the 
currency of a broker-dealer’s software patches, the broker-
dealer’s safety protocols compared to industry standards, 
prior cyberattack attempts, and internal employee issues.157 
 
155 See Matthew F. Ferraro, Note, “Groundbreaking” or Broken? An 
Analysis of SEC Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance, Its Effectiveness, and 
Implications, 77 ALB. L. REV. 297, 310 (2014). 
156 See Mark Jewell, T.J. Maxx Theft Believed Largest Hack Ever, 
NBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2007, 11:17 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
id/17871485/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/tj-maxx-theft-believed-
largest-hack-ever/ [https://perma.cc/8UPN-3ZBB] (illustrating how when 
T.J. Maxx was hacked, although it knew about the breach, it took longer to 
discover exactly what information was compromised). 
157 The National Institute for Standards and Technology implemented 
the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity in 
2014, later amended in 2017, to provide private sector firms with guidance 
on improving their cybersecurity standards. This framework can be used 
by broker-dealers as one tool to assess the adequacy of their security 
controls. See NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, NIST 
Releases Update to Cybersecurity Framework, NIST (Jan. 10, 2017), 
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Furthermore, as is standard practice under many state 
disclosure requirements, the new standard should include a 
safe harbor for successful encryption.158 If hackers or 
insiders obtain access to raw encrypted data but lack the 
encryption key to view the underlying information, there is 
no need to issue a disclosure to customers. This safe harbor 
for successful encryption will ensure a proper materiality 
standard and also encourage firms to maintain strong 
encryption systems. 
D. Level of Detail in a Mandated Disclosure 
When disclosing information that meets the materiality 
threshold, broker-dealers must still consider how much 
information must be disclosed. In the corporate context, 
mandatory disclosures can lower agency costs by compelling 
a corporation’s directors to take better account of the 
shareholders’ interests.159 Similarly, providing broker-dealer 
customers with an adequate assessment of cyber risks can 
help consumers decide whether to open an account and, if so, 
with which firm, while also incentivizing firms to bolster 
their security controls. Failing to do so may result in 
embarrassing disclosures to their customers and consequent 
reputation costs. 
Nevertheless, broker-dealers that fall prey to 
cyberattacks may not want to disclose too much information, 
as over-disclosure could reveal their security weaknesses and 
allow other hackers to exploit them, attack them again, or 
attack similarly situated broker-dealers.160 For instance, 
with access to technical information about a firm, hackers 




158 See supra Section II.D.2. 
159 See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a 
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (arguing 
“that the principal purpose of mandatory disclosure is to address certain 
agency problems that arise between corporate promoters and investors, 
and between corporate managers and shareholders”). 
160 See Ferraro, supra note 155, at 310. 
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engineering strategies, like posing as an employee or vendor 
of the firm in order to access critical parts of the firm’s 
security technology infrastructure.161 In effect, when 
deciding the level of specificity for a mandated disclosure, 
firms must consider an important tradeoff between ex-ante 
deterrence and ex-post revelation of damaging information to 
potential hackers.162 
Therefore, regulators should consider a bifurcated 
approach to disclosure requirements. For actual data 
breaches, the balance should tip towards a much greater 
level of specificity. Customers should have the right to know 
exactly what type of information was stolen, as this will 
inform any precautionary measures they take in response. 
On the other hand, for disclosure of potential risks, the 
broker-dealer should communicate to customers in 
generalities, without enough technical information to tip off 
potential hackers. Despite the unspecific disclosures, 
customers should feel secure knowing that regulators have 
more direct access and information, in the form of SARs and 
occasional OCIE examinations.163 
Alternatively, in the corporate arena, some commentators 
have suggested novel approaches that may provide even 
more assurance to customers. For instance, firms can 
voluntarily subject themselves to an audit by an independent 
cybersecurity auditor, who would review their security 
protocols and issue a public grade.164 One might analogize 
such a system to New York City’s restaurant health rating, 
simplifying a complex set of metrics into an easily 
understandable letter grade.165 This would provide the 
assurance of a detailed disclosure without the risks 
 
161 See Selznick& LaMacchia, supra note 147, at 58. 
162 See id. at 63–64. 
163 See supra Section II.C.2–3. 
164 Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 147, at 61. 
165 See, e.g., Jonathan Wolfe, New York Today: What Do Restaurant 
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associated with revealing technical information.166 However, 
it is not clear how many firms would voluntarily subject 
themselves to such an audit, or if regulators would be willing 
to impose a mandatory audit system. 
E. Cost to Smaller Broker-Dealers 
As with any new regulation, regulators must consider the 
burden imposed by additional disclosure requirements on 
small and midsized broker-dealers that lack the resources 
and staffing available to larger firms. Full compliance with 
new regulations would often require firms to make large 
investments in technology or staffing, costs that might far 
exceed their budgetary constraints.167 For this reason, small 
firms rarely make it through FINRA exams or SEC audits 
without being subjected to fines for regulatory infractions.168 
In fact, some analysts partially attribute the sharp decline in 
registered broker-dealers over the past decade to a large 
increase in regulations that disproportionately impact small 
firms and overwhelm their compliance departments.169 
Regulators can mitigate the burdens of new regulations 
on small firms by providing exemptions for firms based on 
revenues or number of employees. Nevertheless, it is not 
 
166 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 147, at 68. 
167 See Bruce Kelly, 2017 to Be Year of Independent Broker-Dealer 
Mergers, INVESTMENT NEWS (Jan. 22, 2017), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170122/FREE/170119915/2017-
to-be-year-of-independent-broker-dealer-mergers [https://perma.cc/L8SX-
FCJC] (discussing the budgetary and revenue concerns facing smaller 
broker-dealers). 
168 See Ross David Carmel, The DOL Fiduciary Rule’s Effect on Small 




169 See Hester Peirce, Dwindling Numbers in the Financial Industry, 
BROOKINGS (May 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dwindling-
numbers-in-the-financial-industry/ [https://perma.cc/2NK7-88VF]. The 
number of registered broker-dealers declined from 5892 in March 2007 to 
3989 in March 2017, a timeframe during which there was also a sharp 
increase in CFTC and SEC regulations. Id. 
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clear how much of a burden a disclosure requirement would 
impose. Under financial responsibility rules, firms must 
already have the resources to send out limited financial 
disclosures to customers on a regular basis.170 Furthermore, 
even if there are unintended burdens that would 
disproportionately impact smaller firms, regulators should 
impose the requirement under Calabresi and Hirschoff’s 
economic principle of “cheapest cost avoider.”171 As between 
the firm and its customers, the firm has the greater ability to 
protect sensitive customer information from data breaches 
and should therefore bear both the financial liability and 
responsibility of notifying customers about a data breach. 
Moreover, as discussed further below, a federal disclosure 
standard for broker-dealers may actually end up saving costs 
for smaller firms by removing duplication and 
inconsistencies in the current patchwork system of state 
regulations.172 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Congress vs. SEC 
Congress and the SEC are the two potential entities that 
may be tasked with imposing a new broker-dealer 
cybersecurity disclosure standard. As proposed by individual 
Senators numerous times, Congress may enact a sweeping 
disclosure bill to tidy up all of the gaps in the current state 
system.173 Alternatively, under authorization from Congress 
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC may 
promulgate a new rule aimed at broker-dealers.174 
 
170 See 15 U.S.C. § 78q(e)(1)(B) (2012). 
171 See generally Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test 
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) (explaining the 
concept of a cheapest cost avoider). 
172 See infra Section IV.B. 
173 See supra Section II.C.4. 
174 See Norah C. Avellan, Note, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Growing Need for Cybersecurity in Modern Corporate 
America, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 193, 216–26 (2014). See generally Joyce 
Shulman-Kanciper, The Basic Rules of Disclosure, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
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The current political climate is the primary obstacle to 
congressional legislation. As partisan discord and political 
gridlock continue in Washington, it is much harder for 
Congress to take on any comprehensive reform initiative, 
much less one that could anger business lobbyists.175 Even 
proposals with bipartisan backing—like the Personal Data 
Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014, proposed 
by Senator Richard Blumenthal, and the Personal Data 
Notification & Protection Act of 2015, proposed by President 
Barack Obama—lacked the support necessary for passage.176 
Unless a compelling external impetus arises, such as a 
crippling financial cyberattack, it is unlikely that Congress 
will use its political capital to enact new financial disclosure 
obligations.  
Another obstacle to congressional legislation is that a 
statute would be a blunt instrument in a situation that 
requires fine tuning. Both of the bill proposals mentioned 
above address cybersecurity disclosures in the financial 
system as a whole, without singling out specific segments.177 
Congress does not have the institutional competence to iron 
out disclosure requirements for each segment of the financial 
system.  
In contrast, the SEC operates more independently from 
political pressure, with staggered five-year commissioner 
terms and organizational representation from both political 
parties.178 Although the SEC may face pushback and should 
take into account valid industry concerns expressed during 
 
704 (1988) (discussing the SEC’s enforcement powers under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
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the proposed rule’s comment period, the SEC is neither 
elected by nor directly politically accountable to the 
industry.179 This provides the SEC with much greater 
latitude to balance important consumer interests with 
broker-dealer constraints. 
Further, the SEC has already proved itself adept at 
tailoring disclosure requirements for both public companies 
and the banking industry.180 The SEC previously 
contemplated a new broker-dealer disclosure requirement in 
the proposed amendment to Regulation S-P in 2008.181 
Finally, with the growing threats to cybersecurity, the SEC 
will likely have more political support than it did a decade 
ago. For all of these reasons, the SEC—as opposed to 
Congress— should take up this issue. 
B. Federal Preemption 
Similar to what the European Union realized before it 
enacted the GDPR, our current patchwork system of state 
disclosure laws in the United States is a regulatory 
nightmare, especially for smaller broker-dealers.182 State 
laws differ on what materiality threshold triggers a 
disclosure. Some require disclosure only for an actual breach, 
while others require disclosure even if there is just a 
reasonable likelihood of harm.183 Moreover, even if a 
disclosure is triggered, states have different procedures for 
the necessary methods and recipients of a disclosure.184 
Under the current system, firms must understand all the 
subtleties of the various state laws, develop them into 
different disclosure systems in practice, and keep track of 
 
179 See Firestone & Goyer, supra note 105. 
180 See supra Section II.A–B. 
181 See supra Section II.C.4. 
182 See Jacqueline May Tom, A Simple Compromise: The Need for a 
Federal Data Breach Notification Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1569, 1570 
(2010). 
183 See RSA 2012, supra note 144. 
184 See id. 
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any new amendments to state laws.185 Therefore, like the 
GDPR, any new disclosure system for broker-dealers must 
preempt all of the existing state laws.186 Far from only 
serving to benefit consumers, preemption will cut a great 
deal of the regulatory red tape and reduce resources devoted 
to following changes in individual state disclosure laws.187 
One potential issue with federal field preemption is that 
any states that currently have stricter laws—Massachusetts, 
for instance—could end up with losses in protection for their 
residents.188 Moreover, if there are new technological 
developments, states will have their hands tied behind their 
backs in trying to protect their citizens from threats and will 
have to wait for federal regulators to catch up. However, the 
SEC regularly amends old rules to reflect changing practices 
and technological advancements, and can act again if the 
need arises. Furthermore, instituting a baseline system 
offering protection for everyone is better than some 
individuals lacking any protections at all. 
C. New Guidelines 
Under the privacy-oriented framework laid out above, the 
new federal broker-dealer cybersecurity disclosure 
regulations must take into account an appropriate 
materiality standard, the types of information relevant to 
ordinary broker-dealers, and a tailored level of detail in the 
disclosure.189 Given the sheer amount of data that broker-
dealers collect to comply with the Know Your Customer Rule 
and the Suitability Rule, the information protected by a 
disclosure should transcend ordinary bank account and 
social security information.190 In order to maintain public 
confidence in the broker-dealer system, the new regulation 
should also protect information with reputational or privacy 
 
185 See Tom, supra note 182, at 1570. 
186 Id. at 1589–94. 
187 Id. at 1590. 
188 Id. at 1589–90. 
189 See supra Part III. 
190 See supra Section III.B.
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considerations to clients, including trading history, 
investment objectives, and risk tolerance.191 
To that end, the requisite materiality standard that 
triggers a disclosure should be “when the personal data 
breach is likely to result in substantial financial or 
reputational costs to customers.”192 This threshold would 
take into account existing identity theft and embezzlement 
concerns, but would also include a more expansive view of 
client privacy concerns.193 Furthermore, to facilitate 
appropriate resource allocation, this standard would allow 
broker-dealers to respond in proportion to the threat, based 
on a privacy spectrum. Whereas simple DDoS attacks would 
not warrant any disclosure, compromised reputational 
information would require moderate disclosure, and 
compromised financial information would require timely and 
extensive disclosure.194 
When considering the level of detail to disclose, broker-
dealers should be wary of accidentally aiding future hackers 
with overly specific technical information.195 Whereas 
broker-dealers report SARs to FinCEN in abundant detail, 
disclosures to clients should address technical security 
information in broad generalities; specificity should be 
focused on details about the customer information breached 
and what steps the client can take to prevent any further 
harm.196 Finally, although smaller broker-dealers may 
criticize the new regulation as overly burdensome, there 
should not be any exemptions based on revenues or number 
of employees.197 The only way to fully protect broker-dealer 
customers is through uniform and consistent policies, and 
smaller firms will enjoy the benefits of federal preemption, 
 
191 See supra Section III.B. 
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which should cause a net decrease to their compliance 
expenditures.198 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the current financial regulatory system, public 
companies and banks must disclose to consumers 
cyberattacks that affect their sensitive personal information. 
However, broker-dealers are noticeably absent from the 
equation, after both Congress and the SEC failed in attempts 
to introduce new requirements. The SEC should look to 
recent developments in the European Union and individual 
states that have pioneered data disclosure notification rules 
and adopt a broad cybersecurity disclosure requirement for 
broker-dealers. The disclosure would inform anyone who has 
a brokerage account if their information has been hacked 
and what the potential risks of maintaining a brokerage 
account are vis-à-vis cybersecurity. 
One major departure from prior standards would be a 
focus on consumer privacy, as opposed to firm security, 
which is already comprehensively addressed in the 
regulatory sphere. Within this model, personal information 
would include more than just credit card and social security 
numbers, and would even encompass sensitive information 
about trading habits and investor profiles. The disclosure 
requirement would follow a spectrum, in proportion to the 
importance of the information at risk and the potential 
consequences for consumers. Moreover, to protect the 
interests of broker-dealers more broadly, federal preemption 
of state laws would remove some of the current hassles of 
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